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Abstract
In this paper, we present a framework for supporting intelligent fault and performance management
for communication networks. Belief networks are taken as the basis for knowledge representation and
inference under evidence. When using belief networks for diagnosis, we identify two questions: When
can I say that I get the right diagnosis and stop? If right diagnosis has not been obtained yet, which test
should I choose next? For the first question, we define the notion of right diagnosis via the introduction
of intervention networks. For the second question, we formulate the decision making procedure using
the framework of partially observable Markov decision processes. A heuristic dynamic strategy is
proposed to solve this problem and the effectiveness is shown via simulation.
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1 Introduction
Communication networks have become indispensable today and this trend will continue as more and
more new technologies emerge. Due to the growing number of networks that have served as the critical
components in the infrastructure of many organizations, interest in fault management has increased during
the past decade [8][18][19][28].
In a communication network environment, we categorize the term fault as either hard or soft. Hard
faults consist of hardware or software faults [28]. Hardware faults include incorrect or incomplete logic
design, damage, wear or expiry, etc. Software faults usually come from incorrect or incomplete design and
implementation. However, there are still some other important kinds of faults that need to be considered.
For example, the performance of a switch is degrading or there exists congestion on one of the links.
Another example is to model faults as deviations from normal behavior [29]. Since there might not be a
failure in any of the components, we call such faults soft faults. Hard faults can be solved by replacing
hardware elements or software debugging. Such diagnosis is called re-active diagnosis. Soft faults are in
many cases indications of some serious problems and for this reason, the diagnosis of such faults is called
pro-active diagnosis. Handling soft faults is typically part of the functionality of performance management
[11][24] and in the sequel, we use the term fault to represent both hard and soft faults for convenience.
The task of fault management is to detect, diagnose and correct the possible faults during network
operations. Fault detection can be thought of as an online process that gives indication of malfunctioning.
To declare the existence of such malfunctioning, we need a model of “normal” behavior against which
comparisons can be made. Such normal behavior could be specified as a finite state machine, as in the
case of protocol or software testing [5][23][37]; or it could be a derived model according to operation status
and/or statistical analysis, for example Auto Regressive (AR) model [12] and Generalized Likelihood Ratio
(GLR) model [36]. Such indications of malfunctioning are manifested in the form of events, which must be
correlated to diagnose the most likely fault(s) [8][15][22][32]. Finally, corrective actions are taken to restore
the normal operations. In this paper, we focus on fault diagnosis issues.
Efficient fault management requires an appropriate level of automation. Knowledge based expert sys-
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tems, as examples of automated systems, have been very appealing for communication networks fault
diagnosis [20]. Usually, such systems are based on deterministic network models. A serious problem of
using deterministic models is their inability to isolate primary sources of faults from uncoordinated network
events. Observing that the cause-and-effect relationship between symptoms and possible causes is inher-
ently nondeterministic, probabilistic models can be considered to gain a more accurate representation. As
a natural and efficient model for human inferential reasoning, belief networks have emerged as the general
knowledge representation scheme under uncertainty and key technology for diagnosis [10][16][30][34].
In communication networks fault management field, Hood and Ji [12] proposed a pro-active network
fault detection scheme based on AR models and belief networks. Selected Management Information Base
(MIB) variables were monitored and their normal behaviors are learned via AR modeling. Belief networks
were used to compute certain posterior probabilities, given some deviations from the normal behavior.
However, their belief network model is over simplistic in that there is only one root node, which will ex-
plain whatever anomalies as detected by the AR modeling. It estimates the network status in a snapshot;
there is no further test suggested. In [13], Huard and Lazar used a more general belief network model with
multiple root nodes as the candidate faults. They also presented a dynamic programming (DP) formulation
for the network troubleshooting problem. However, single fault assumption was made, which limits the
applicability. In this paper, we develop a framework that supports fault diagnosis for communication net-
works. General belief network models with multiple root nodes are chosen as the knowledge representation
scheme. We handle multiple faults and formulate the fault diagnosis procedure as a Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) problem with optimal stopping. To help solve the problem, we
introduce the notion of right diagnosis for optimal stopping and provide a dynamic, heuristic strategy for
test sequence generation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce belief networks and in section 3,
we identify two problems when using belief networks for diagnosis. We introduce the concept of intervention
networks and right diagnosis for the first problem in section 4, and the decision theoretic fault diagnosis
strategies are studied in section 5. We run simulation in section 6, and conclude the paper in section 7.
3
2 Belief Network as the Probabilistic Fault Model
A belief network, also called a Bayesian network or a causal network, is a graphical representation of
cause-and-effect relationships within a problem domain. More formally, a belief network B = (V ,L,P) is a
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) in which: The nodes V represent variables of interest (propositions); The
set of directed links L represent the causal influence among the variables; The strength of an influence is
represented by conditional probability tables (CPT). For any node in the DAG, given its parents, that node
is conditionally independent of any other node that is not its descendent. This conditional independence
makes a belief network model a compact representation of the joint probability distribution P over the
interested variables. Belief networks can also serve as the inference engine, and can compute efficiently any
queries over the variables modeled therein[14][16][30]. Let us look at one example.
Suppose we are handling the problem call failure and identify the possible causes as follows: Server, link
and switch may fail, and there might be heavy traffic that causes the network congestion. Luckily, we have
access to the alarms associated with link failure and switch failure. This scenario is modeled as a belief
network, as shown in figure 1. Each node takes binary value and the table associated with it represents
the conditional probability distribution, given its parent nodes’ instantiations. Without any observations,
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Figure 1: An example Belief Network
Now suppose we observe that there are call failures. We wish to infer the most probable cause for this










































Figure 2: Initial marginal probabilities
and obtain the updated beliefs of each non-evidential node, as shown in figure 3. Note that for each
candidate fault node, namely Link Failure, Server Failure, Heavy Traffic and Switch Failure, the probability
of being faulty is increased. If we also observe link alarms, then we hope that this extra information could
help locate the most probable fault, see figure 4. As we would have expected, the evidence of link alarms
distinguishes Link Failure as the most probable fault, which also ”explains away” other possible candidates









































Figure 3: Updated beliefs after observing Call Failure
The above example shows the sketch of doing diagnosis using belief networks: obtain evidence, update
beliefs, obtain evidence again, and so on. This is active diagnosis in that we are seeking more information










































Figure 4: Updated beliefs after observing Call Failure and Link Alarm
3 Fault Diagnosis Problems using Belief Networks
In communication networks, probes are attached to some hardware/software components to get operation
status. Typically the raw data returned from the probes will be grouped into vector form d ∈ Rn and
then processed to get some aggregated values (e.g. average, peak value, etc.). A statistics is a function
from Rn to R that maps the raw data vector d to a real number. Such statistics will usually be quantified
and represented using discrete values. We use 0 to represent normal status, and other positive integers to
represent abnormal status with different level of severity. A node v in a belief network model B = (V ,L,P)
is called observable if and only if it represents the health status of a statistics, or corresponds to a user
report. The set of observable nodes is denoted by O. The non-observable set is simply Õ = V \ O. We
restrict these observable nodes to be leaf nodes only, and vice versa. The regular evidence set R contains
those nodes that we observe during regular network monitoring operations. Each r ∈ R is called a symptom
node. The test set ST contains all other observable nodes that are not currently in R, namely ST = O \R.
The fault set F is the set of root nodes, and they are not observable, F ⊆ Õ. We restrict that all root
nodes are binary valued. The hidden node set H contains all nodes in Õ but not in fault set F , H = Õ \F .
Hidden nodes are intermediate nodes between faults and symptoms and we don’t usually put queries on
them during diagnosis.
The problem domain is said to be working in normal status with respect to regular evidence set R if
and only if every node in R takes value 0, or vector r = 0, where r = (r1, r2, . . . , r|R|). The problem domain
6
is said to be working in abnormal status with respect to regular evidence set R if and only if there is at
least one r ∈ R whose value is other than 0. There might be cases when multiple symptom nodes in R
take nonzero values. The syndrome with respect to regular evidence set R is simply the nonzero vector r.
Any syndrome can trigger the diagnosis process.
After fault diagnosis is triggered, the initial evidence is propagated and the posterior probability of any
f ∈ F being faulty can be calculated. It would be ideal if we can locate the fault with efforts up to this.
But most of the time, similar to what happens in medical diagnosis, we need more information to help
pinpoint the fault. So naturally, we identify two important problems associated with belief network based
fault diagnosis: When can I say that I get the right diagnosis and stop? If right diagnosis has not been
obtained yet, which test should I choose next? We address these two problems in the next sections. In our
work, we postulate that all the observations and tests are constrained within the belief network model.
4 Right Diagnosis via Intervention
Consider what a human usually think during diagnosis. After obtaining one possible reason, one may nat-
urally ask, for example, “Will the problematic circuit work normally if I replace this suspicious component
with a good one?” He/she then goes ahead and sees what will happen after the replacement. If the syn-
drome disappears, one can claim that he/she actually found and trouble-shooted the fault. If the problem
domain is tiny, not very complex, and the replacement burden is light, this paradigm will work well. But
for communication networks, the story is totally different. We would like to do intelligent diagnosis via
computation, rather than brutal replacement before we are very confident what the fault is.
To do this, we need to distinguish between two kinds of semantics for the instantiation of a node in a
belief network: passive observation and active setting. All the instantiations of nodes we have talked about
so far are passive observations, and we would like to know the consequences of, and the possible causes
for such observations. The alternative semantics is that we can also set the value of a node via active
experiment. One example is the above question, where external reasons (the human diagnoser) explain
why the suspicious component becomes good and thus all the parent nodes for this node should not count
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as causes during belief updating. Other belief updating like evaluating consequences, however, are not
influenced by this active setting. This external force is called intervention in [31].
With this set semantics, we could do virtual replacement in our belief network model. For simplicity,
we assume here that the single symptom node is S1. For each node in F , we could get its posterior
probability of being faulty given S1 = 1. Let f = argmaxg∈FP (g = 1|S1 = 1), and we would evaluate
P (S1 = 0|setting(f = 0)). Other nodes in F are treated as background variables and they keep at the
same status as what has just been updated. In our work, we introduce the so-called intervention belief
network to help this virtual replacement.
Definition 4.1. An intervention belief network B̃ = (V ,L,P ,S ,Fs) is obtained from the original belief
network B = (V ,L,P) with the same V , L, P . S is the symptom set and Fs ∈ F is the set of suspicious
nodes. We compute for each s ∈ S the probability P (s = 0|setting(Fs = 0)) using B̃.
For our particular example above, the virtual replacement procedure is as follows. First, in B =
(V ,L,P), update for each node fi ∈ F the probability pi
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= P (fi = 1|S1 = 1). Suppose f1 = argmaxg∈FP (g =
1|S1 = 1). Then in intervention belief network B̃ = (V,L, P, S1, f1), set node f1 = 0, and with P (fi =
1) = pi, i = 2, · · · , |F |, compute P (S1 = 0|setting(f1 = 0)). To determine whether or not this virtual
replacement has led S1 to an acceptable status, we need a reference value for the computed P (S1 =
0|setting(f1 = 0)) to compare with. Without any evidence input, the belief network model B itself gives
the marginal probability of each leaf node to be normal. We use these values as the reference in our work.
Definition 4.2. Given a small number ε, we say that node S1 becomes ε -normal via intervention on f1
if and only if P (S1 = 0) − P (S1 = 0|setting(f1 = 0)) < ε.
Note that during diagnosis process, some of the testing nodes chosen may already manifested themselves
as values other than “normal”. These nodes should also be included in intervention network B̃.
Definition 4.3. A nonempty set of suspicious nodes Fs is called the explanation or right diagnosis if and
only if every node in set S, including both initial and newly-found symptoms, becomes ε-normal if we set
every node in Fs to normal in the intervention belief network B̃ = (V,L, P, S, Fs). It is when Fs explains
the set S that we terminate the diagnosis process.
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5 Decision Theoretic Fault Diagnosis Strategies
We formulate the test selection procedure as a partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP)
problem with optimal stopping. At each decision epoch, we could either choose a node to test or stop
there. Test is rarely free, and termination incurs some costs. The goal is to find a good test sequence and
the right time to stop. We will show that by choosing termination cost appropriately, the optimal stopping
rule matches our notion of right diagnosis.
5.1 POMDP Formulation
State Space S
The state is the status of the root nodes F = {F1, . . . , F|F |}, and for a particular s ∈ S = 2
|F|,
s = {f1, . . . , f|F |}. We use Sk to denote the state at time k. In our diagnosis case, the current state, which
is unobservable, does not change regardless what tests will be chosen. The goal of diagnosis is to identify
this state by using initial symptoms and subsequent test results. So here we have
P (Sk+1|Sk) =





If we choose one test per decision epoch, the time step set is defined as N = {1, 2, . . . , |ST |}. The active
evidence set AE contains the nodes that are instantiated during the process of diagnosis. Initially AE = R
and it expands as more test nodes in ST are added into it. Nodes in AE are not to be considered for future
use. The candidate test set Cst contains the nodes in ST that are available to be chosen and tested. Initially
Cst = ST and it shrinks as instantiated nodes are removed from it. The action set A = Cst ∪ {STOP}.
Let Zat denote the value obtained by observing at, and we define the history process up to time k as
Ik = (Z0, (a1, Za1), . . . , (ak, Zak)) , where Z0 =
(
(r1, Zr1), . . . , (r|R|, Zr|R|)
)
represents the regular evidence
set and corresponding instantiations. Ik grows with diagnosis and obviously, Ik = (Ik−1, (ak, Zak)), the
Markov property. We can simply take Ik as the state at time k and obtain a completely observable Markov
decision problem. But the growing state process makes this approach impractical.
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Belief / Information State
Given Ik, we define bk = P (F|Ik) as the probability distribution of states in S. It is proven that bk
is a sufficient statistics that contains all information embedded in the history process for control, and we
call it belief or information state [1][3]. Using Bayes rule, we can easily verify that the process {bk} is also
Markov. If we choose bk as the state at time k, we avoid the growth of the state space; but now, the state
space is continuous, and we call it Bc. In our case, if we are given Ik, ak, andZak , the next belief state bk+1
is uniquely determined via belief network propagation, and we define Ψ(bk, ak, Zak)
4
= Pr(bk+1|bk, ak, Zak).
If we let X = Bc ∪ {T} and xk be the state at time k, then the augmented states evolve according to
xk+1 =

Ψ(xk, ak, Zak) ifxk 6= T andak 6= STOP
T ifxk = T or (xk 6= T andak = STOP )
(2)
The observation model for ak 6= STOP is P (Zak |Ik, ak) = Pr(ak = Zak |Ik).
Choosing Suspicious Nodes
After we obtain xk, it will not suffice to give out this probability distribution directly as the result.
What is needed is the explanation. To see if we could obtain the explanation as defined above, we need
to extract from xk the suspicious nodes. However, it is always an important issue to determine how many
suspicious nodes we should choose from the fault set F . In our belief network model and the parallel
intervention model, we should be discreet in choosing multiple nodes. If we simply choose all nodes in F
and do the intervention, the symptom nodes will all become ε-normal for sure. But clearly, calling every
node in F as faulty is not acceptable; One of the most important aspects of fault diagnosis in general is to
bias among the many possible faults and locate the real one(s)! In our work, we tried two schemes.
In the first scheme, we compute for each node in F the probability of being faulty given Ik, and sort
them in a descending order, say p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ p|F |. We only choose the first j nodes such that∑j
k=1 pk/
∑|F |
k=1 pk ≥ η, where η ∈ (0, 1). It should not be close to 1, since in that case, we would have to
choose almost all nodes in F . In our work, we choose 0.4 initially. If we could not find the right diagnosis,
we increase η by a small amount so that more root nodes could emerge as the candidates. By doing this,
we are not limiting ourselves to the single fault scenario. This scheme is intuitive, Ik suffices to provide
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information for each node in F , and it is not necessary to calculate xk. However, it is very hard to choose
a good η that works well without knowing in advance how many faults there might be.
The second scheme makes use of xk. We first compute the belief state and get a table that contains the
joint distribution of the root nodes given Ik. Then we choose the largest entry from the table and mark the
index of the entry. The suspicious nodes are obtained from the index. For example, if we only have four
root nodes and the binary string corresponding to the index of the largest entry is 0101, then the second
and fourth nodes are chosen. In this scheme, there is no need to find a good η, and it adapts to multiple
causes easily. The drawback is that extra storage space is needed for the joint distribution table. If the
number of root nodes is small, this is a preferable scheme.
Cost Structure
There is an immediate cost associated with each si ∈ ST . The cost function C(si, t) entails careful
deliberation about many factors like the difficulty and time to be consumed for the test, etc. Here we assume
that the cost function is of form C(si). This is usually the case in that the cost is normally associated
with the test itself only, and the test itself does not usually change with time. Also, we wish to diagnose
promptly and we penalize on diagnosis steps. If ak = STOP at time k, no penalty. Otherwise, we penalize
this extra step using function g(k). Here, we simply take g(k) = 1 for all k. At time k with state xk 6= T ,
if we choose ak = STOP , we incur t(xk) as the termination cost. Note that t(T ) = 0. Given xk 6= T and
suspicious node set Fs, we compute t(xk) as follows. First, in original belie network, let K = F \ Fs and
compute for each node in K the probability of being faulty as qi
4
= Pr(Ki = 1|Ik). Second, in intervention
network, set the root nodes that correspond to those in K with the same probabilities as those in {qi},
and set the root nodes that correspond to those in Fs to state ”normal”. Finally, in intervention network
for each node Si in the active symptom set S, and for some given small ε, define ∆ = P (Si = 0)− P (Si =
0|Setting root nodes as above). If ∆ < ε, tSi(xk) = 0, else tSi(xk) = CONST [∆ − ε ], where CONST
is a constant to make tSi(xk) large. The total cost is t(xk) =
∑
Si∈S
tSi(xk). So, the immediate cost of
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choosing action ak at time k with state xk 6= T is
gk(xk, ak) =

c(ak) + g(k) if ak 6= STOP
t(xk) otherwise
(3)
At the last step N , the terminal cost gN (xN ) is defined as
gN(xN ) =

t(xN ) ifxN 6= T
0 otherwise
(4)










5.2 Solution for the Problem
Define Jk(xk) as the cost-to-go at state xk and time k [3]. At termination state T , Jk(T ) = 0, ∀k =
0, . . . , N − 1. For xk 6= T , we have the dynamic programming algorithm:




[ c(ak) + g(k) +
∑
j
P (ak = j|Ik)Jk+1(T (xk, ak, Zak = j)) ]
 (7)
So the optimal stopping policy is: Choose STOP if
t(xk) ≤ min
ak∈Ak
[ c(ak) + g(k) +
∑
j
P (ak = j|Ik)Jk+1(Ψ(xk, ak, Zak = j)) ] , (8)
at current state xk and time k. If we choose t(xk), as shown above, such that t(xk) = 0 in the case of right
diagnosis and let t(xk) be very large otherwise, then the optimal stopping policy is: STOP if and only if
we obtain the right diagnosis. Now let us look at the test selection strategies.
To solve the problem (5) using the dynamic programming update (7), the continuous state space is
the major obstacle. It would be very desirable if we could find some structures for the value function or
optimal policy. In one class of problems [21], the optimal value function for the finite horizon problem is
piecewise linear and concave. Thus we could represent the value functions using a set of discrete vectors
and avoid the direct handling of the continuous space. Unfortunately, we don’t have this good property in
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our problem, and we need to seek to approximate methods. As discussed above, we need to extract from
state xk 6= T the suspicious node set Fs. We ignore those root nodes that are not very fault-prone and
his is our first approximation. Now, given that Fs does not explain the current active symptoms, we need
some heuristics to help choose the next test. Let us begin with a simpler problem for intuition.
Suppose the concern here is to locate the single faulty component. There are symptoms indicating the
malfunction (e.g. car doesn’t start) and for each possible faulty component there is a direct test associated
with it. The cost for testing component i is ci. Based on the symptoms, we obtain Pi, the probability
that component i is in failure, for every component. We are supposed to test those components one at
a time. As soon as one component fails its associated test, we claim that we find the single fault and
stop. By interchange argument [3], it is easy to see that in an optimal strategy, all elements must be in
non-decreasing sequence of c/P values, see also [17].
Our problem is different from this scenario in the following aspects. It tackles failures while our problem
integrates both hard and soft faults. It assumes the existence of direct test while we don’t have that luxury.
For a communication network environment which is distributed, complex and heterogeneous, it is impossible
to predefine and store a direct test for each possible cause. Actually one of the goals here is to generate
dynamically the test sequence on the fly. In our setup, right diagnosis is determined through computation,
rather than brutal replacement. Finally, our algorithm should be able to tackle multiple faults.
But the c/P algorithm does provide insight in that it reflects the following observation: in order to
minimize the total cost, people are more likely to try those more fault-prone, cheaper components before
the less-probable, expensive ones. In our diagnosis algorithm, we wish to find an appropriate test node st
if Fs could not explain the active symptom set S. In particular, we would like to choose the test node
from candidate test set Cst that is cheapest and most relevant to Fs. To achieve this, we need a measure
for relevance between a test node in Cst and a fault node in Fs.












y∈Y p(x, y|Ik) log
p(x,y|Ik)
p(x|Ik)p(y|Ik)
is the conditional mutual information between random variable X
and Y [6]. R(X;Y |Ik) ∈ [0, 1] indicates to what extent Y can provide information aboutX. R(X;Y |Ik) = 1
means that Y can uniquely determine X, while R(X;Y |Ik) = 0 indicates that Y and X are independent,
given current Ik. Note that R(X;Y |Ik) 6= R(Y ;X|Ik). More generally,





where H(X|Ik) and I(X; Y|Ik) are defined similarly as above.
With the relevance measure, our next test node given Ik at time k is simply
st = argmaxg∈CstR(Fs; g)/c(g), (9)
and our fault diagnosis process is summarized as follows, also shown in figure 5.
• Step 1. Initialization
– Set time step tp = 0, AE = R, Cst = ST .
– Input evidence by setting the nodes in set AE according to current active values ae.
• Step 2. Belief Propagation in belief network B and get the set of suspicious nodes Fs according to scheme
one or two.
• Step 3. Set the root nodes in B̃ = (V ,L,P ,S ,Fs) accordingly, and execute the intervention. If Fs explains
S, update total cost and TERMINATE.
• Step 4. Get next testing node
– If Cst = Φ, update total cost and give out the set Fs and say ”Didn’t find the right diagnosis, but here
is the list of possible faults in decreasing order”.
– Else: Get node st according to (9).
• Step 5. Observing test node st and get observation Zst
– Input this evidence st = Zst to original belief network B. Update tp, Cst, and AE .
– Goto Step 2.
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Original Belief Network Intervention Network
Figure 5: Illustration of the diagnosis process using intervention belief network
6 Simulation
To illustrate the effectiveness of our fault diagnosis algorithm, consider the example network in figure 6.
Two switches SW1 and SW2 are connected via link L1. We have a probe a hooked at the end of SW2
to measure the traffic throughput going out of SW2. Suppose the information we could obtain during
network operation include whether or not: SW1 alarm is normal, A could connect SW2, B could connect
SW2, A could connect C, C could connect SW1, throughput at probe a is normal, and D could connect
SW1. The possible faults are identified as: SW1 works normal or not, L1 normal or congested, SW2
normal or not, and source pumped from C to L2 is normal or not. We set up a belief network model for








Figure 6: Example Network
Let us look at one diagnosis scenario. Suppose we observe that A Conn SW2 goes wrong, and we get
the updated distribution as shown in figure 8. We see that SW1 is the suspicious node and the intervention
result is P (A Conn SW2 = yes|Intervention) = 0.78. Initially, P (A Conn SW2 = yes) = 0.83, and we







































































Figure 7: Belief Network for Example Network
is chosen and the observation of it is “normal”. The updated distribution is shown in figure 9. Again, L1
is intervened and no right diagnosis is obtained. The next node selected this time is A Conn C and the
observation is “abnormal”. We got the updated distribution again in figure 10. If we intervene node L1,






































































Figure 8: After A Conn SW2 Goes Wrong
As a comparison to our node selection scheme, we use the random scheme meaning that each time we
need a test node, we simply choose one uniformly from all current available nodes in Cst. In our simulation,
the outcome of chosen test node st is uniformly generated as either 0 or 1. The costs for testing each leaf
node is shown in Table 1, with 40 as the penalty for not being able to find the right diagnosis. Table 2
shows for three scenarios the comparisons of the two test generation schemes with 2000 runs, which take













































































































































Figure 10: After A Conn C Observed as Abnormal
selection via relevance is much better than that via random selection.
Table 1: Cost for All Leaf Nodes
SW1 Indicator A Conn SW2 B Conn SW2 A Conn C Thru Prob A C Conn SW1 D Conn SW1
2 1 7 1 3 1 3
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a framework that supports intelligent fault and performance management for
communication networks. We used belief networks as the knowledge representation scheme and inference
engine for the problem domain. The optimal stopping problem is tackled by using the notion of right
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Table 2: Comparison of Node Selection Schemes
Symptom Nodes
Random Selection Relevance Selection
Avg. Cost Success Rate Avg. Cost Success Rate
A Conn SW2 15.38 84.5% 9.13 94%
A Conn C 26.21 70.1% 14.22 88%
A Conn SW2 and A Conn C 24.68 67.8% 3 100%
diagnosis via intervention, and test selection is based on a heuristic dynamic strategy. Simulation shows
that this scheme is much superior than a random selection scheme. Note that as evidence accumulates, we
may input them one by one followed by a propagation right after each evidence-input, as we have shown
in this paper, or we may input them once altogether and do only one propagation. This provides us the
flexibility for either on-line diagnosis or off-line diagnosis/analysis.
This framework is quite general. The belief network model and the associated decision making algorithm
could exist at any management station in a network management system. After a test node is chosen, the
observation for this test may take advantage of the traditional SNMP paradigm by polling appropriate
MIB variables; or, delegated (mobile) agents could be sent to the network elements to collect the data by
using the management by delegation paradigm [7][9]. As one example of such an agent-based environment,
the authors presented in [26] a couple of system designs for adaptive, distributed network monitoring and
control, and in a sister paper also submitted to this conference [27], the authors discuss in more details
the idea of change of logic. Further, the managed system could be divided into domains [33], and for
each domain we could assign such an “intelligent” module that take charge of the fault and performance
management for it [2][25].
The dynamic heuristic strategy could be improved via reinforcement learning [4][35], and in particular,
Q-learning techniques [38]. The idea is that, by interacting with the environment, the decision making
module could accumulate experience and improves its performance. We could use the above dynamic
strategy as the starting point. One possible problem when using Q-learning is that we need to represent
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each state explicitly to store the associated learned value. As we discussed above, this might be intractable.
However, by noticing that there will be many cases that our diagnosis could stop within only a couple of
steps, we can truncate the expanding state space significantly. We will discuss the details in a forthcoming
paper. Also, simulation on a more complex network environment is on the way.
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